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Congressional Sanction of Illicit 
Cohabitation-The Tax Reform Act of 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress lowered t 
1969 
,he income 
tax rates for unmarried individuals in an attempt to reduce the 
disparity between the amount of taxes paid by a single person and 
the amount paid by a married couple with the same total in- 
come.' By the enactment of this statute, Congress inadvertently 
created what has been called the "marriage penalty." 
The marriage penalty is the amount of tax a married couple 
must pay, using the rates applicable to married persons, over that 
which they would pay if they were allowed to compute their tax 
individually using the rate tables for single persons. Where only 
one spouse works outside the home, the penalty is nonexistent. 
But where both spouses are employed and earn approximately 
equal incomes, the penalty is imposed, affecting both low- and 
high-income couples and increasing as both spouses' incomes in- 
crease.* 
This development has caused a substantial outcry among 
those affected. Opponents of the legislation accuse Congress of 
subsidizing those couples who choose to live together without the 
benefit of matrimony and complain that it causes both an in- 
crease in the divorce rate and a breakdown in the marriage rela- 
tionship. 
This Comment traces the history of tax law in this area, 
analyzes the controversy as it exits today, discusses the constitu- 
tionality of the rate structure, and suggests potential alternatives 
to the present rate structure. 
1. See STAFF OF THE JOINT C O M M ~ E  ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 9 1 s ~  CONC., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION F THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, a t  223 (Comm. Print 1970). The 
reasons given for the change in the single person rate table were that 
[ulnder prior law, the tax rates imposed on single persons were quite heavy 
relative to those imposed on married couples at  the same income level; a t  some 
income levels a single person's tax was as much as 42.1 percent higher than the 
tax paid on a joint return with the same amount of taxable income. . . . [The 
new] rate schedule is designed to provide tax liabilities for single persons which 
are 17 to 20 percent above those for married couples . . . with the maximum 
differential of 20 percent . . . . Id. a t  223. 
2. G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 34 (1975). 
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A. The History 
Prior to 1948 everyone was taxed according to individual in- 
come, irrespective of marital ~ t a t u s . ~  The change in this practice 
was precipitated by the decision in Poe v. S e a b ~ r n , ~  which ac- 
corded more favorable tax treatment to married taxpayers living 
in community property states than to married taxpayers living in 
non-community property states. 
In Poe the Court held that in community property states a 
married couple could file separate tax returns, each reporting 
one-half of total marital income. Where only one spouse earned 
income, each spouse could report one-half of the total and thus 
pay a lower combined income tax because of the lower marginal 
rates. This concept is known as "income-splitting." 
Because of the benefits that income-splitting provided, many 
states adopted community property laws. To achieve geographi- 
cal tax equity and thus neutralize Poe, Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code in 1948, allowing all married couples to 
file joint returns. The rates for married couples filing jointly were 
set at one-half the rates for single persons at  each income level, 
eliminating the tax advantage of living in a community property 
~ t a t e . ~  
As a result of this change, a single taxpayer earning the same 
income as a married couple was required to pay a substantially 
higher amount of taxes than the married couple. In some cases 
the disparity exceeded forty percent? Congress finally altered this 
situation in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. For taxpayers with in- 
comes between $14,000 and $100,000, the new single person rate 
table established a tax liability for single taxpayers a t  no more 
than twenty percent above the liability for a married couple a t  
the same income level? The Act requires married couples to ei- 
ther file a joint return or, if they file separate returns, to use a 
3. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 
(1978). See also Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both 
Spouses are Working: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 
2d Sess. 60-61 (1972) (statement of Albert H. Turkus) [hereinafter cited as 1972 
Hearings]. 
4. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
5. See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 
(1978); 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 60-61 (statement of Albert H. Turkus). 
6. S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1969), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE 
ACTS: TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1966-1970, at 1639, 1909 (West 1971). 
7. Id. 
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table composed of rates set a t  twice the joint return rate a t  all 
income levels, thus providing no tax incentive for a married cou- 
ple to file separate returns." 
The net effect of these provisions is the marriage penalty. 
Because the rates for single persons are now less than twice the 
rates for married couples filing a joint return, and because mar- 
ried couples can no longer file separate returns and use the single 
person rate tables, a married couple earning approximately 
equivalent incomes pay more tax than they would if they were 
unmarried .g 
B. The Controversy 
The economic effects of the marriage penalty are best illus- 
trated by Table 1:' which shows the dollar amount of the penalty 
at  various income levels. 
TABLE 1-1976 Marriage Penalty by Income Compensations 
Husband's 
Adjusted 
Gross 
Income 
Zero 
2 , m  
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
10,000 
12,000 
14,000 
16,000 
18,000 
1 20,ooo 
Zero 
Zero 
Zero 
-177 
-248 
-319 
-405 
-458 
-486 
-625 
-787 
-932 
2,000 
Zero 
54 
121 
91 
6 1 
- 13 
- 40 
-123 
-190 
-287 
-382 
Wife's' Adjusted Gross Income 
All calculations assume that each taxpayer elects the standard deduction. Computations do not 
include the 1976 General Tax credit. A minus sign indicates a tax reduction. 
8. Id. See also Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. ~ l : ) ,  cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1046 (1978). 
9. Two less significant factors also play a role in the marriage penalty. These factors 
arise because of the provision that a married couple must either file a joint return or use 
the special rate schedule for married persons filing separately. 
The first factor is the standard deduction. I.R.C. 5 63(d). The standard deduction, 
or zero bracket amount as it is now called, is significantly less for a married couple than 
for two individuals filing as single persons. This zero bracket amount is currently $3300 
for married persons filing jointly. ($1650 for married persons filing separately) and $2300 
for single persons. Thus, two single individuals are allowed to deduct $4500 as a standard 
deduction whereas a married couple may only deduct $3300. 
The second factor is the general tax credit. I.R.C. 5 42 provides for a credit of two 
percent of taxable income up to $9000, or $35 times each exemption claimed by the 
taxpayer, whichever is greater. Unless the taxpayer claims more than five exemptions, the 
maximum credit is $180. The IRS maintains that a married couple is entitled to only one 
$180 credit even if both taxable incomes are above $9000. Mapes v. United States, 576 
F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). 
10. Table 1 is derived from a chart in Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,905 (Ct. 
1 ,  cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). 
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The criticism most often voiced against the current rate 
structure is that the marriage penalty encourages couples to live 
together without the benefit of matrimony, and encourages mar- 
ried couples to obtain a divorce. One emotional appeal stated: 
[Tlhe whole institution of marriage has been gravely threat- 
ened by the recent changes in the income tax laws. By making 
it so profitable to "live together in sin", the Federal Government 
has virtually rocked- the foundation of marriage. Many of those 
who understood the impact of the change in the tax laws ob- 
tained divorces last year. Many more will get divorces this year, 
unless the marriage tax is repealed. 
. . . Those who got their divorces before last year's tax 
deadline plead for a way to be able to live together, married, 
without having to pay thousands of dollars for the right. 
Many other members are wrestling with their religious con- 
victions, and finding it difficult to believe that the Government 
is actually taxing their union before God." 
The controversy has been fueled by the proliferation in the 
number of working wives. According to one author: 
The tax laws were given their present form a t  a time when it was 
considered normal for the husband to work and the wife to re- 
main a t  home. At present, the majority of married couples are 
both earners, and it is no longer appropriate to treat the one- 
earner couple as the norm.12 
A 1978 Duke University study states that "[iln the twenty year 
period from 1956 to 1976, the labor force participation of married 
women doubled by rising from 11 million to 22 million."13 The 
study also notes that 
50% of all women are in the labor force, and . . . now make up 
42% of all U.S. workers. . . . Complete figures for the year 1976 
show that out of nearly 47 million families headed by a husband- 
wife couple 22 million of the wives were on the labor mar- 
ket. . . . In fact, less than one-quarter of American families of 
11. 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 125 (statement of Britten D. Richards, Executive 
Director, National Association of Married Working Couples). See also id. at 41 (statement 
of Christine Beshar, representing the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
Committee on Sex and Law). 
12. G. BREAK & J.  PECHMAN, supra note 2, at 34. 
13. Z.I. Giraldo, Tax Policy and the Dual Income Family: The "Marriage Tax" and 
Other Inequities 1-1 (1978) (available from Center for the Study of the Family and the 
State, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University). 
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four rely solely on the  wages of the  male head-of- 
household. . . . I4 
Thus, forty-four million taxpayers were to some extent affected 
by the marriage penalty in 1976. 
According to a press release issued by Senator Charles Ma- 
thias, sponsor of a bill currently before the Senate that proposes 
to eliminate the marriage penalty: 
Five years ago, a t  least 13 million "two-earner couples" 
were penalized, paying a marriage tax of approximately $2 bil- 
lion to the government. Nearly all these couples had combined 
incomes of less than $50,000. Now, the Internal Revenue Service 
estimates that more than half of all taxpayers are married, and 
that a t  least half of all married couples are two-earner couples. 
That means that as many as one-quarter of the taxpayers in the 
United States might be victims of the tax on marriage.15 
Some couples have attempted to circumvent the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 by obtaining a "temporary divorce." A married couple 
could obtain a divorce just before the close of the taxable year, 
usually in a foreign jurisdiction to avoid the'strict divorce laws 
still prevalent in many American jurisdictions, and then remarry 
shortly after the yearend. Thus, they would be "single" a t  the 
close of the taxable year, which, under the present tax law,16 is 
the date when marital status is determined for the entire taxable 
year. The Commissioner attempted to end this practice by issu- 
ing Revenue Ruling 76-255." According to the ruling, such di- 
vorces are only intended to be effective for tax purposes. They are 
"sham transactions" and the parties are not "single" within the 
meaning of the Code. 
The impact of the marriage penalty on the rapidly changing 
social and moral structure of the American family is presently 
unknown. But even if one disregards the "living in sin" argument, 
one cannot escape the fact that the penalty has had a significant 
economic impact on married couples. 
In. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The tax rate structure of the Internal Revenue Codel"as 
survived two recent constitutional attacks based upon the effects 
14. Id. 
15. Press Release by Senator Charles McC. Mathias (June 28, 1979). 
16. I.R.C. § 143. 
17. 1976-2 C.B. 40. 
18. I.R.C. § 1. 
TAX DISCRIMINATION 
of the marriage penalty. In deciding each of these cases, how- 
ever, the respective courts did not apply consistent standards of 
review. 
In Mapes v. United Stateslo the court rejected the arguments 
in favor of a heightened standard of review and applied the defer- 
ential standard usually associated with taxing statutes-rational 
basis.20 On the other hand, in Johnson v. Unites  state^,^' the court 
found a significant burden on plaintiff's fundamental right to 
marry and on their fundamental rights of privacy and associa- 
t i ~ n , ~ ~  and applied the strict scrutiny, or compelling state inter- 
est, standard of review? Although the two courts applied differ- 
ent standards of review, they both upheld the statutory scheme, 
the Mapes court finding a rational basis for the scheme, and the 
Johnson court a compelling state interest. 
A. The Application of Strict Scrutiny 
1. The fundamental right to marry 
a. Background. The Supreme Court recognized as early as 
1923, in Meyer v. N e b r a ~ k a , ~ ~  that the right to marry was pro- 
19. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 US .  1046 (1978). 
20. The rational basis standard that is normally applied to taxing statutes is an 
extremely deferential one and its application almost always results in the statute being 
held valid. This standard creates a presumption of the statute's validity and places a 
heavy burden on the individual to demonstrate that the statute is not rationally related 
to a legitimate state purpose. No taxing statute subjected to this standard has ever been 
found unconstitutional. 
21. 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550 
F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978). 
22. The fundamental right to marry has generally been associated with the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, whereas the right to privacy is associated 
with the due process clause. Thus it is important to distinguish between the two clauses 
when raising these constitutional issues. This Comment, however, will discuss the general 
application of strict scrutiny versus rational basis and the relationship of these tests to 
the fundamental rights involved, without probing which fundamental right goes with 
which clause. This treatment is adequate because once a fundamental right has been 
found to have been violated, the strict scrutiny test applies, regardless of whether the 
specific fundamental right is protected under the equal protection clause or under the due 
process clause. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur- 
ring). The application of the strict scrutiny standard almost always results in the statute 
in question being held unconstitutional. A presumption of invalidity of the statute arises 
when this standard is applicable, and a heavy burden is placed on the government to show 
that it has a compelling state interest for keeping the statute in force. 
23. Various other arguments were raised for the application of strict scrutiny, but 
were summarily dismissed by the court. These other arguments consisted of sex discrimi- 
nation and invasion of the plaintiffs' right to freely practice their religion. These argu- 
ments do not appear particularly meritorious and will not be discussed here. 
24. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
946 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
tected under the aegis of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee 
of due process of law. Later the Court noted, "Marriage and pro- 
creation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race. "25 
More recently, the constitutional right to marry has been 
articulated under the banner of the right of privacy,26 receiving 
greater support than ever before. This newest phase of constitu- 
tional protection of marital rights had its genesis in 1965 in 
Griswold v. Conne~t i cu t .~~  In that case, the Court struck down a 
Connecticut law that forbade the use of contraceptives by mar- 
ried couples. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, declared 
that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights created penumbras of 
constitutional protection that, although not specifically enumer- 
ated in the  Bill of Rights, must  be recognized because 
"[w]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights would be 
less secure. "28 
Griswold held that the marriage relationship lies within a 
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
 guarantee^."^ Justice Douglas stated: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school 
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. 
It is not an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; 
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects. Yet, it is an association for as 
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.30 
The Court, finding that the state was seeking to achieve its goals 
by means having a "maximum destructive impact" upon the 
marriage relationship, held the statute uncon~titutional.~~ 
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 520 (1925). 
25. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasis added). See generally 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
26. The right of privacy has developed in the following cases: Lanza v. New York, 
370 U.S. 139 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
516-22 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,365- 
73 (1959); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 463-66 (1952); Breard v. City 
of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
28. Id. a t  482-83. 
29. Id. a t  485. 
30. Id. a t  486. 
31. It is difficult, a t  best, to determine from Griswold when the right of marital 
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In Loving v. Virginia" the Supreme Court struck down a 
Virginia miscegenation statute, finding a violation of both the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth 
amendment. The Court found that the statute invidiously dis- 
criminated on the basis of race and infringed upon plaintiffs' 
fundamental right to marry. The Court noted: "The freedom to 
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Mar- 
riage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our 
very existence and s~ rv iva l . "~~  Numerous decisions have cited 
Loving for this propostition," but because it was difficult to de- 
termine how much reliance Loving had placed on the right to 
marry, as opposed to the finding of racial discrimination, the 
right to marry was not firmly established. 
Two recent cases finally accomplished this task. In Zablocki 
v. Redhail," the Court squarely held that the right to marry is a 
constitutionally protected right. Zablocki is also important be- 
cause, in distinguishing a case decided only two months earlier, 
Caiifano v. J ~ b s t , ~ V h e  Court formulated the test to determine 
under what circumstances the right to marry is violated. The 
Court held that state action must "significantly interfere" with 
the right to marry before it will be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
In Zablocki a Wisconsin statute requiring noncustodial fa- 
thers to pay all of their arrearages in child support before marry- 
ing was declared unconstitutional. The statute required the fa- 
ther to appear before a court and show that all such arrearages 
had been paid before the court would grant the necessary permis- 
sion to marry. 
privacy has been violated because no specific test appears to have surfaced from that 
decision. Although Justice Douglas used the words "maximum destructive impact," it is 
certainly arguable that something less than that may be required. The "significant inter- 
ference" test that surfaced in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U S .  374 (1978), may be enough to 
show a constitutional infringement in this context also. See notes 35-39 and accompanying 
text infra. First, it can be argued that the right to marry and the right to remain married 
are indistinguishable-because they have the same constitutional status, their infringe- 
ment should be subjected to the same test. Second, the right to marry and the right to 
marital privacy have often been discussed in the same context and have become so inter- 
woven that some courts have treated them as identical rights. 
32. 388 U S .  1 (1967). 
33. Id. a t  12 (emphasis added). 
34. See, e .g ,  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U S .  113, 152 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U S .  371, 376 (1971). See also 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U S .  693, 713 (1976); Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 
423 U S .  44, 46 (1975); ,United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 438 (1973). 
35. 434 U S .  374 (1978). 
36. 434 U S .  47 (1977). 
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In Jobst the Court rejected a constitutional attack on sec- 
tions of the Social Security Act providing for termination of a 
dependent child's benefits upon marriage to an individual not 
entitled to benefits under the Act. The Court found no infringe- 
ment of plaintiff's right to marry, because the rule requiring ter- 
mination of benefits upon marriage was not "an attempt to inter- 
fere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as impor- 
tant as marriage."" 
Neither Zablocki nor Jobst can escape criticism. Zablocki 
distinguished Jobst by finding that the operation of the statute 
in Jobst was not a significant interference with the plaintiff's 
freedom to marry while the operation of the statute in Zablocki 
was. This distinction is questionable because the Zablocki Court 
was relying on a footnote in Jobst that stated that the plaintiff's 
federal benefit payments actually decreased by only twenty dol- 
lars per month because of the availability, due to his marriage, 
of other benefits. The Court compared this twenty dollars per 
month decrease in benefits to the statutory scheme in Zablocki 
that required a certain class of Wisconsin residents to obtain 
court permission to marry. Court permission was granted only if 
the party showed he had satisfied all his child support obliga- 
tions. 
The cost of marriage in Jobst,  however, was potentially 
higher than the twenty dollars per month that the plaintiff in 
Jobst was forced to forego. These two cases appear to be effec- 
tively doing the same thing, precluding an individual from marry- 
ing because of financial  consideration^.^' 
In Jobst the Court rested its rejection of the fundamental 
right argument upon the finding that the Social Security Act was 
not an "attempt" to interfere with anyone's decision to marry. 
Whether the Act was an attempt a t  interference, however, is irrel- 
evant. The statute in Zablocki was an attempt to force fathers to 
support their children, not to prevent those fathers from marry- 
ing. The effect, of course, was to prevent them from marrying, as 
was the effect, to a lesser degree, in Jobst. But it was that effect 
which the Zablocki Court declared unconstitutional. 
Many [persons], able in theory to satisfy the statute's re- 
quirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that 
37. Id. at 54. 
38. The Court of Claims in Mapes read the Jobst and Zablocki opinions together to 
establish a rule that the right to marry is not violated unless the interference "operates 
to preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of people." 576 F.2d at 901. This reading 
is not totally correct and will later be discussed. 
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they will in effect be coerced into foregoing their right to marry. 
And even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's 
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of 
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be 
f~ndamen ta l .~~  
I t  is unclear how the significant interference test will ulti- 
mately be applied: How significant must the interference be be- 
fore i t  will be declared unconsitutional? The facts in Zablocki 
were such that the plaintiff could have been totally precluded 
from marrying, yet the language of the Court indicates that some- 
thing less than total preclusion constitutes a significant interfer- 
ence. 
b.  Analysis. Both Mapes and Johnson involved constitu- 
tional attacks by married persons upon the tax rate structures. 
In both cases plaintiffs alleged that the rate structure infringed 
on their fundamental rights of marriage and privacy. Although 
the two courts applied different standards of review, they both 
upheld the contitutionality of the tax rate structure. The Mapes 
court justified its action by applying the rational basis test, while 
the Johnson court, although applying strict scrutiny, justified its 
action by finding a compelling state interest. The court in Mapes 
read Zablocki and Jobst together to stand for the proposition that 
"the application of strict scrutiny is appropriate only where the 
obstacle to marriage is a direct one; i.e., one that operates to 
preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of people, as in 
Za blocki. This conclusion is not entirely correct. 
The statute in Zablocki did not totally preclude all persons 
in the class4' from marrying in all cases. The only persons actually 
precluded from marrying were those who could not meet their 
support obligations for minor children not in their custody. Those 
who could meet their support obligations were not precluded from 
marrying but, as the Court stated, their right to marry was still 
"sufficiently burdened [so that] . . . in effect . . . [they were] 
coerced into foregoing their right to marry."" The Court further 
held that "even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's 
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of 
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be 
39. 434 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added). 
40. 576 F.2d at 901. 
41. The class consisted of all noncustodial fathers with delinquent child support 
payments. 
42. 434 U.S. at 387. 
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f~ndamenta l . "~The  Mapes court itself explicitly recognized that 
the tax rate structure could represent such an intrusion: "[T]he 
elevated tax burden might in fact dissuade some couples from 
entering into matrimony, [although it] does not present an insu- 
perable barrier to marriage."44 
The conclusion that Zablocki and Jobst require the obstacle 
to marriage to be direct has some support. In Zablocki plaintiff 
was required to appear before a court, which determined whether 
he had met the requirements for marriage. If the court found that 
he had not, it could absolutely prevent him from marrying. The 
statute in Jobst, on the other hand, would not absolutely prevent 
anyone from marrying. It would only result in a receipt of fewer 
Social Security benefits should one decide to marry. It remains 
unclear whether this distinction will preclude the finding of a 
violation of the right to marry in all cases where a party either 
loses benefits or is required to undertake additional obligations 
only after the marriage has taken place. 
A liberal reading of Zablocki would undoubtedly find the 
marriage penalty unconstitutional. The facts in Zablocki were 
such that the right to marry was directly affected by the statute, 
but the language quoted earlier, stating that those who meet the 
requirements and actually do marry also suffer a violation of their 
fundamental rights, indicates that the Zablocki reasoning is 
much broader than the facts there warrant. The marriage penalty 
could coerce an individual into foregoing his right to marry, an 
effect that Zablocki found constitutionally impermissible. 
The Johnson court's finding of an infringement upon the 
plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry45 appears correct, since 
nearly any definition of a significant interference would include 
a potential cost of thousands of dollars per year. It remains un- 
clear, however, how the courts will actually deal with this situa- 
tion. 
43. Id. 
44. 576 F.2d at  901. 
45. 422 F. Supp. a t  973. The court called the infringement a "constitutionally signifi- 
cant burden." Id. This appears to be consistent with the "significant interference" lan- 
guage of Zablocki. 
It is questionable whether the Johnson court actually did find an infringement upon 
the fundamental right to marry, because they merely "assumed" such an interference 
existed due to the availability of an overriding compelling state interest. The court of 
appeals merely affirmed the district court's decision without commenting on the standard 
of review. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977). At least one decision 
has cited Johnson for its finding of an infringement of the right to marry and the resulting 
application of strict scrutiny. See Jansen v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 
1977). 
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Even if the Mapes court was correct in its failure to find a 
violation of the right to marry, it failed to deal with the fact that, 
by requiring some married couples to pay additonal taxes because 
they are married, the statutory scheme encourages them to obtain 
a divorce. The question then raised is whether the existence of a 
tax penalty levied on those couples who choose to remain married 
constitutes, in the words of Justice Douglas, "a maximum de- 
structive impact" upon the marriage relationship. Griswold was 
originally interpreted by the courts as preserving sanctity of the 
marriage bed, and it is unclear whether it would be extended to 
this type of interference with the marital relationship. A broad 
reading of Griswold could invalidate this statutory scheme. Jus- 
tice Douglas believed that the statute banning contraceptives 
indirectly destroyed the marital relationship. The tax rate struc- 
ture does even more-it operates directly on the marriage, forcing 
those who cannot or will not pay the additional tax to sever their 
marital ties. 
2. The compelling state interest test 
If the infringement of the right to marry can be found, the 
strict scrutiny test is applicable and the government may impose 
the marriage penalty only if it can demonstrate that it has a 
"compelling state interest" in maintaining the tax rate structure 
in its present form. The compelling state interest test was defined 
in Dunn u. B l u m ~ t e i n ~ ~  in the following manner: 
[State laws subject to strict scrutiny] are unconstitutional un- 
less the State can demonstrate that such laws are "necessary to 
promote a compelling governmental interest.". . . [A] heavy 
burden of justification is on the State, and . . . the statute will 
be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes. 
. . . [Tlhe State cannot choose means that unnecessarily 
burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. . . . [I]f 
there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the State's] goals 
with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a 
State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts 
at  all, it must choose "less drastic means."47 
Three requirements can be gleaned from the preceding defi- 
nition, which must be met before the compelling state interest 
46. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
47. Id. at 342-43. See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S .  618, 634 (1969). 
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test can be satisfied. First, the government must show that its 
purpose or interest in passing the legislation is constitutionally 
permis~ible.~~ Second, the governmental interest must be shown 
to be sufficiently substantial." Third, the means used by the 
government must be necessary to achieve the desired purpose, 
that is, no alternatives can exist that would intrude to a lesser 
degree upon the rights of the parties involved and that would still 
allow the government to achieve its purpose." The government 
concededly bears an extremely heavy burden in attempting to 
48. A state may legitimately assert that the purpose of a statute requiring race to be 
taken into account in its college admissions program was to maintain a diverse student 
body. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). It may assert that its 
purpose in passing legislation requiring illegitimate children to meet certain standards of 
proof before being permitted to inherit from their fathers was to establish an orderly 
method of property disposition and to prevent unnecessary delay in estate administration. 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). A state purpose of inhibiting migration by needy 
persons into the state by requiring them to serve a fixed term of residency before receiving 
welfare payments, however, is not legitimate. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
Likewise, a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot con- 
stitute a legitimate governmental interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Furthermore, racial classifications are per se impermissible, regard- 
less of the justification offered by the state. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Classifi- 
cations based on alienage are sometimes given the same treatment. See, e.g., In re Grif- 
fiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richard- 
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress may 
condition alien's elgibility for Medicare on five-year continuous residence in United 
States). 
49. Traditionally, administrative convenience has not been considered compelling. 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Frontier0 v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). A state's interest in protecting the health of a 
mother by preventing her from obtaining an abortion was found to be not substantial 
enough to overcome her fundamental right of privacy, a t  least during the first trimester 
of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Similarly, a legitimate state interest of 
reducing the work load on probate courts by allowing only men to be appointed as estate 
administrators was declared insubstantial. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
50. A state may not establish strict racial quotas for minorities in administering its 
college admissions program even though it is doing so in an attempt to further the legiti- 
mate state goal of attaining a diverse student body. By simply taking race into account 
along with other factors and thereby refraining from establishing rigid quotas, the state 
may still attain the desired ends and do so in a way that is not constitutionally flawed. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Similarly, a state cannot 
completely bar an illegitimate child from inheriting from his father when it may just as 
easily achieve its goal by requiring a stricter evidentiary standard for illegitimate as 
opposed to legitimate children. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Furthermore, a 
classification is not necessary for the achievement of a state purpose where the classifica- 
tion and purpose bear an insufficient relationship to each other, i.e., where the means and 
ends do not achieve a sufficiently close fit. A statute that permitted only property taxpay- 
ers to vote in a school board election was found to be insufficient to achieve an asserted 
state purpose of limiting the voting to those who were "primarily interested" in such 
elections. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also City of Phoenix 
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 402 (1979); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
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pass this test. According to Justice Burger, "[s]o far as I am 
aware, no state law has ever satisfied [the compelling state inter- 
est test], and I doubt one ever will . . . . "51 
The government asserted in Johnson that three state inter- 
ests are served by the present tax provisions: first, the need to 
raise revenue; second, the need to treat married couples with 
equal incomes equally; and third, the need to reduce the taxes 
levied on single persons so that they never exceed 120% of the tax 
on married couples with equivalent incomes. All three of these 
legislative goals are concededly constitutionally permissible, and 
in light of the extreme deference usually given to taxing 
schemes," it can be argued that these purposes are compelling." 
Therefore, the issue is whether the taxing scheme complies with 
the third requirement of the test-the present statutory scheme 
must be necessary to satisfy the proposed state interests and no 
less intrusive means of attaining those interests can exist. 
The Johnson court held that because the statute in question 
involved taxation, the usual requirement of ascertaining whether 
a less restrictive alternative exists was not applicable, stating 
that "the tax system is an 'arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist'. . . . [Tlhis court cannot require the Government to dem- 
onstrate more convincingly than it has that no less burdensome 
means exist. To do so would be effectively to abrogate the consti- 
tutional taxing power of Congress."" The court went on to state 
that "this court finds itself ill-equipped to judge the merits of 
plaintiffs' suggestions or of the many others which might be of- 
fered. . . . The process of evaluating specific tax proposals and 
of weighing their relative discriminatory impacts is primarily a 
legislative, not a judicial, f ~ n c t i o n . " ~ ~  
The court cited two cases in support of this proposition-San 
Antonio Independent School District u.  RodrigueP and 
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
52. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
53. An argument could certainly be made to the contrary. This Comment, however, 
will not attempt to do so. In the government's favor is the extreme deference usually given 
to taxing statutes. On the taxpayer's side is the violation of his fundamental rights. The 
court must necessarily balance these competing interests and determine which is more 
substantial. The Johnson court found the scales to be tipped in favor of the government. 
The necessity aspect of the compelling state interest test, however, is much more objective 
in nature and will encompass the remainder of this subsection. 
54. 422 F. Supp. a t  974. 
55. Id. 
56. 411 U S .  1 (1973). 
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Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad .57 Neither case supports the 
decision in Johnson. Sun  Antonio was a class action brought on 
behalf of school children who resided in school districts having 
low property tax bases. The suit challenged a Texas school fi- 
nancing scheme that relied on local property taxation to deter- 
mine the level of per-pupil expenditures in the districts. The 
plaintiffs maintained that this system favored the more affluent 
by providing more funds per pupil to the districts that had a 
higher value of assessable property, allegedly providing those 
pupils with a better education. 
San Antonio is distinguishable from Johnson because the 
San Antonio Court declined to find the existence of a fundamen- 
tal right, and applied the rational basis test. As stated in Sun 
Antonio, "[olnly where state action impinges on the exercise of 
fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to 
have chosen the least restrictive a l t e rna t i~e . "~~  Brushaber was 
also decided under the rational basis test, and it contained no less 
restrictive alternatives analysis. Brushaber is far afield from the 
proposition for which Johnson cites it. Brushaber states that the 
due process clause can never be a limitation on the taxing power 
of Congress because, if it were, the Constitution would conflict 
with itself. This absurd view, if accepted, would mean that Con- 
gress could levy a tax on all black persons merely because they 
are black. Moreover, Brushaber was decided in 1916, not in 1976 
as cited in Johnson. 
Thus, no support exists for the proposition that the less in- 
trusive alternatives analysis is inapplicable merely because the 
statute being subjected to strict scrutiny involves taxation. In 
fact, it can be inferred from dicta in San Antonio that the oppos- 
ite is true? 
In applying the less restrictive alternatives analysis, if an 
alternative to the present statute exists that accomplishes the 
same purposes for which the statute was originally intended, but 
with a less intrusive impact upon fundamental constitutional val- 
ues, the attacked statute must fall. Such alternatives may easily 
be formulated with respect to the present tax rate structure. A 
detailed analysis of one such formulation appears in Section IV. 
This proposed rate structure entirely eliminates all constitutional 
defects. 
- 
57. 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
58. 411 U.S. at 51. 
59. Id. 
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B. Irrebutta ble Presumption Analysis 
One other constitutional argument was offered in both 
Johnson and Mapes-that the statute in question creates a pre- 
sumption that may not be rebutted by a proffer of evidence and 
is not universally true, and thus violates the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. This argument is known as the 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine and is based on Hoeper u. Tax 
Commission of W i ~ c o n s i n , ~  a 1931 Supreme Court decision. 
In Hoeper a Wisconsin taxing statute requiring married cou- 
ples to aggregate their incomes for the purpose of computing their 
state income taxes was successfully challenged. Because the tax 
rate schedules were progressive, the amount of tax due as a result 
of the aggregation of income was always higher than the amount 
that would have been due had each spouse computed the tax 
separately, based on individual income. Although the statute al- 
lowed couples to file either jointly or separately, the aggregation 
of income was required in either case. 
The Court held the statute violative of due process, stating: 
We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions 
which underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure 
the tax on one person's property or income by reference to the 
property or income of another is contrary to due process of law 
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not 
in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made such by calling it 
income.61 
The courts in both Johnson and Mapes questioned Hoeper as 
good law and distinguished it on its facts, claiming that the stat- 
ute in Hoeper was different from the federal tax statute and that 
the Hoeper rule was therefore not applicable because of the Su- 
preme Court's recent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi.62 The 
Johnson court was probably correct in questioning Hoeper as 
good law. Weinberger arguably laid the irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine to rest.63 But to the extent Weinberger did not overrule 
60. 284 U.S. 206 (1931). 
61. Id. at 215. 
62. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
63. Hoeper was decided in 1931, at a time when the irrebuttable presumption doc- 
trine was flourishing. The Court determined that by permitting an individual to be taxed 
on income earned by his spouse, the statute created an irrebuttable presumption of control 
by one spouse over the other's property, which was not the case in many instances. Hoeper 
cited Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926), the leading case at that time on 
irrebuttable presumption, and was itself cited in numerous subsequent irrebutable pre- 
sumption cases. See, e . g ,  Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 92 
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Hoeper, the Johnson court's treatment of Hoeper and the irre- 
buttable presumption doctrine is questionable. 
The Johnson court maintained that the provision in the Wis- 
consin statute that violated the fourteenth amendment was the 
requirement that the income of both spouses be aggregated for 
computation of the tax, irrespective of whether joint or separate 
returns were filed. The court distinguished the present federal tax 
statute because it does not contain a similar provision. This dis- 
tinction is not entirely correct. 
The constitutional flaw in Hoeper may not have been the 
income aggregattion requirement per se. The Wisconsin statute 
allowed for the filing of separate returns, provided that both 
spouses' incomes were aggregated for the computation of the tax. 
The statute required the tax be "paid by each in the proportion 
that the average income of each [bore] to the combined average 
(1935); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172,178 (1933); Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 
444 (1933); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 142 (1932). But see Fernandez v. Wiener, 
326 U.S. 340, 365-66 (1945). 
Not long after Hoeper, the doctrine fell into a long period of disuse but has recently 
emerged, much to the dismay of Justices Burger and Rehnquist. The formal reemergence 
came in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), where a statute requiring 
a pregnant teacher to take a maternity leave beginning five months prior to her expected 
date of delivery was found to be an impermissible presumption that all pregnant women 
who are within five months of delivery are unfit to teach. Since LaFleur other decisions 
have relied on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to invalidate various statutes. See 
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
(1973); Kellems v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 556, 560 (1972). But see Mourning v. Family 
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). 
Weinberger, however, has inspired some serious doubts as to whether the doctrine 
retains any vitality. The Weinberger Court was faced with determining the constitution- 
ality of a Social Security provision that prevented surviving spouses and stepchildren of 
deceased wage-earners from receiving any Social Security survivorship benefits on the 
death of the wage-earner, where the marriage between the wage-earner and the surviving 
spouse took place within nine months of the wage-earner's death. The district court had 
concluded that '"the requirement constitutes a presumption that marriages like Mrs. 
Salfi's, which did not precede the wage-earner's death by at  least nine months, were 
entered into for the purpose of securing Social Security benefits,"' id. a t  767-68 (quoting 
Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974)), found such presumption 
conclusive and, citing Cleveland Rd. of Educ., declared the provision unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. and the other 
cases cited by the district court, on the ground that each of the cases cited involved a 
"constitutionally protected status." The Court stated that the situation before the Court 
in Weinberger was simply a constitutional challenge to social welfare legislation and 
should be governed by cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which 
require only that an extremely deferential standard of review be applied. Weinberger 
unquestionably dealt a severe blow to the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, and it is 
doubtful whether any constitutional challenge based on the doctrine would prevail if 
brought before the present Supreme Court. 
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income."64 Therefore, each spouse paid a tax on his own income, 
but because the tax was computed on the combined income of 
both spouses and then allocated, the tax was higher than it would 
have been had each spouse been allowed to compute the tax 
individually. 
The constitutional flaw in the statute, therefore, was argua- 
bly not the actual aggregation of incomes but the effect the aggre- 
gation had. If the Wisconsin taxing scheme had not called for 
graduated tax rates, the statute would not have violated the Con- 
stitution because the tax due would have been the same whether 
computed on each spouse's individual income or on the aggregate 
incomes of both spouses. 
The federal statutory scheme has the same effect as did the 
invalidated Wisconsin law. Under federal law, a married couple 
may either file a joint return, aggregating their incomes for the 
purpose of computing the tax, or they may file separately, com- 
puting the tax on their individual incomes. The only distinction 
between the federal and Wisconsin statute is that when a married 
couple in Wisconsin decided to file separate returns, they were 
required to aggregate their incomes for computation of the tax, 
whereas present federal law contains no explicit aggregation re- 
quirement. Nevertheless, the effect under either statute is to re- 
quire the couple to pay more tax. 
Under federal law, the couple may choose not to aggregate 
their incomes, but if they so choose, the amount of tax they pay 
will be at least as much and in most cases more than they would 
pay should they choose to aggregate. This is arguably no choice 
at all. The federal statute, in effect, is exerting economic pressure 
on married couples to aggregate their incomes and pay a tax 
higher than they would pay if they were single. This was held 
unconstitutional in Hoeper. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Since 1969 various proposals have been offered in an attempt 
to reform the tax rate structure and to eliminate the marriage 
penalty. The proposal most commonly mentioned has been 
drafted into a bill which is currently awaiting subcommittee 
hearings in both the Senate and the House of  representative^.^" 
- 
64. 284 U.S. at 213. 
65. S. 336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979) 
(introduced by Sen. Mathias); H.R. 3609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. El711 
.(daily ed. Apr. 10, 1979) (introduction of a bill by Rep. Fenwick). See also 1972 Hearings, 
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This proposed bill would allow married couples who choose 
to file separate returns to use the rate table for single persons, 
rather than the less advantageous rate table for married persons 
filing separately. This procedure would effectively eliminate the 
marriage penalty,"" but would create many problems of its own. 
According to one author, 
[tlhe enactment of a single rate schedule for all taxpayers, 
regardless of their marital status, . . . [or, alternatively, allow- 
ing married couples to use the rate table for single taxpayers if 
they so choose], would mean (a) unequal tax burdens for many 
equal-income married couples . . . ; (b) restoration of the tax 
advantages of residence in community property states-or, as a 
device to eliminate these advantages, the development of rules 
attributing community income to one spouse rather than 
equally to both; and (c) revival of the problem of income split- 
ting between spouses, a subject that has been virtually quies- 
cent since 1948 . . . . 67 
A better proposal is available that would eliminate the mar- 
riage penalty, correct the constitutional flaws of the present rate 
structure, and avoid the creation of new problems. This proposal, 
suggested by several authors,68 is called the "dual-rate system." 
Under this system, one rate schedule would be used for single 
taxpayers and for married couples filing joint returns. A different 
rate schedule would be applicable to married couples who file 
separately. The rates in the latter schedule would be set a t  twice 
the rates in the former schedule for each income level, thus neu- 
tralizing the effect of income-splittingF' All taxpayers with equal 
incomes would pay the same rate of tax regardless of marital 
status or residence in a community property state. Further, if 
Congress desired to retain the policy that married couples should 
pay less tax than single individuals with the same income, it 
could establish a tax credit for married couples. 
The major contribution made by this plan would be the elim- 
ination of the constitutional flaws of the present rate structure. 
Because the marriage penalty would no longer exist, claims that 
supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Albert H.  Turkus, Associate, Tax Reform Research 
Group; accompanied by Thomas H. Stanton, Director). 
66. But see note 9 and accompanying test supra. 
67. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, '27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1442 
(1975). 
68. See, e.g., Betz, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single 
Taxpayers, 7 U .  MICH. J.L. REF. 667, 688 n.154 (1974). 
69. Id. at 689. For a detailed example of this system, see id. 689 n.155. 
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the tax rate structure infringes upon the right to marry could no 
longer be made.'O Further, the three state interests advanced by 
the government in favor of the changes made in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 would be satisfied. 
First, the need to raise revenue would be met because Con- 
gress could set the new rate table a t  the level needed to raise the 
desired amount of revenue. Second, the need to treat married 
couples with equal incomes equally would be satisfied because 
everyone with the same income would pay the same amount of 
tax, and all married couples would be allowed the same amount 
of credit. Finally, the need to reduce taxes on single persons so 
that they never exceed 120% of the tax on married couples with 
equivalent incomes would be met. 
Moreover, this proposal will avoid the resurgence of the old 
problems that have plagued Congress over the years. One prob- 
lem creating much concern is the potential of income-splitting in 
community property states. This was eliminated in 1948 with the 
advent of the joint return, but many critics feel that reform such 
as that suggested in the proposal before the Congress would cause 
its return." The proposal supported by this Comment, however, 
would not do so. If a married couple in a community property 
state would decide to split their incomes and file separate returns, 
they would pay the same total tax as if they had filed a joint 
return, because the rates for married persons filing separately 
would be twice the rates for joint returns a t  the same income 
levels. Thus, a married couple could achieve no tax advantage by 
income-splitting under the dual-rate system. - 
The marriage penalty, notwithstanding its inadvertent en- 
actment to assist a certain class of taxpayers, is infringing upon 
the constitutional rights of a substantial number of Americans. 
In light of the extreme deference given to federal tax statutes, the 
courts may never vindicate the rights of these affected taxpayers. 
The current legislative proposals designed to eliminate the mar- 
riage penalty would create so many additional problems that 
their enactment is unlikely. 
70. However, to totally eliminate the marriage penalty, certain minor changes will 
need to be made in the standard deduction and general tax credit provisions of the Code. 
See note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
71 .  See, e.g., 422 F .  Supp. at 974. 
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An alternative is available that would eliminate the current 
problems with the rate structure; it would also be easy to imple- 
ment. Congress should enact this alternative now. 
James L. Musselman 
